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Abstract As consumer use of information and communication technology (ICT) products
grows, the importance of ICT standards in consumer markets also grows. While standards
for manufactured products were once developed at the national level in formal standards
bodies, standards for ICT products today are more likely to be developed by informal
standards bodies that target global markets, creating new challenges for national consumer
protection laws. As part of the process of creating a single market, the EU developed an
innovative and successful form of “coregulation” known as the “New Approach” that
coordinated the work of legislators and standards developers to reduce technical barriers to
trade in the internal market. In order to protect consumer interests in markets for ICT
products effectively, another “New Approach” is needed to coordinate the work of global
ICT standard-developing organizations with the goals of national and regional consumer
protection laws, but the institutional challenges facing such a strategy are daunting. The
French DADVSI legislation represents progress in this direction; further progress may be
possible by adopting “better regulation” strategies.
Keywords Standardization . Consumer protection . Information and communication
technologies . Digital rights management . DADVSI
Goods and services that are integrated into information and communication technology
(ICT) networks are transforming the lives of consumers today. ICT networks require
interoperability to function, and in turn, standards often play a critical role in assuring
interoperability. As a practical matter, ICT standards have been regulating consumers’ use
of new technologies for some time, but national consumer protection laws have not yet
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been updated to take account of the growth of this form of “soft law” (Kirton and
Trebilcock 2004, pp. 22–23). A generation ago, when technical standards for consumer
products focused on conventional manufactured goods, it was common for product
standards to be developed by national standards bodies working within the framework of
national economic regulation, which made it feasible for national regulators to exercise
some control over standards for consumer products. As the nature of the goods and services
that consumers use has changed, the environment within which technical standards are
developed has also changed. Just as ICT networks now have a global reach, ICT standarddeveloping processes have a global reach, making it difficult for national regulators to track
their activities, much less to exercise any control over them.
Harnessing the power of technical standards to serve consumer protection legislation is
never an easy task due to the risks of statutory obsolescence or inefficiencies caused by
“technology-forcing legislation” (Miller 1995) or of getting bogged down in the complex
politics of health and safety regulation (Breyer 1982, pp. 109–118; Cheit 1990, pp. 3–5).
ICT standards play a critical role in achieving interoperability and thus the value consumers
derive from ICT products, but exist in a bewildering array of forms. ICT standards range
from de facto standards created by the popularity of a proprietary technology (such as
Microsoft’s Windows operating system or Apple’s iTunes music service) to the products of
informal private standard-developing “consortia” that generally operate beyond the control
of national regulators (Cargill 2001) and to de jure standards produced by formally recognized international standards organizations such as the International Telecommunications
Union. Furthermore, there is little consensus regarding what constitutes an ICT standards
consortium: The term might describe the efforts of a handful of multinational corporations
acting as a partnership or alliance to develop a specific product or it might describe
sprawling, open, popular organizations such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
or the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).1
Coordinating the development and implementation of various kinds of de facto standards
with the goals of national consumer protection laws will be difficult. Recent legislation in
France that prohibits “technical protection measures” used by IPR owners to prevent piracy
from interfering with interoperability of consumer ICT products can be seen as a tentative,
ad hoc attempt by national regulators to respond to this problem. However, a more coherent
response from regulators may be required to arrest the incremental deregulation of
consumers’ use of ICT products that is occurring as a result of the increasing globalization
of ICT markets. The notion of “better regulation” may provide a helpful framework within
which attempts by national authorities to insure that global ICT standards serve the interests
of consumers can be assessed, although this would require the political will to advance
consumer interests in the face of intense lobbying for standards focused on advancing
producer interests, which appeared to be absent in the Department for Business Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform consultation on strategies to combat peer-to-peer file-sharing
(BERR 2008).

Regulatory Challenges from Growth of Consumer ICT
In 1943, when Thomas Watson, then chairman of IBM, said, “I think there is a world
market for maybe five computers,” it was not yet clear how computers and other
1

A list of thousands of standards consortia can be found at http://www.consortiuminfo.org, a Web site
maintained by Andrew Updegrove.
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information technologies would change the lives of ordinary consumers. By 2008, it has
become clear that consumers’ lives are being transformed by goods and services that
incorporate ICTs. As new technologies have become pervasive in the lives of ordinary
consumers, what were once minor or isolated challenges to the framework of consumer
protection law have become major issues. The first consumer ICT products, such as
personal computers or mobile phones, were clearly distinguishable from more traditional
consumer goods and touched the lives of relatively few consumers. The first personal
computers introduced in the 1970s may have been of interest to only a few hobbyists, but
they have now become essential appliances for most households. According to the US
Census Bureau, in 2003, 63% of American households had personal computers and had
mobile phones (US Census Bureau 2007). In 2007, the Commission found that there were
more mobile phones than people in the EU (CEC 2007).
The migration of ICT products into the mainstream of consumers’ lives has put pressure
on both consumers and merchants to adapt. Just as consumers have been challenged to
understand new products, manufacturers and retailers have been challenged to find new
ways of marketing them. Establishing the rights and obligations of consumers with regard
to software on computers was a major challenge in the early years of personal computer use
and remains a major challenge today. In the absence of a clear statutory framework,
software developers, consumer advocates, courts, and legislatures have struggled with only
limited success to clarify the rights and obligations of manufacturers, software publishers,
retailers, and consumers in software. While US courts have generally deferred to merchant
innovations such as “shrinkwrap” software licenses (Winn and Wright 2008, § 6.02), in
other countries, they have met with greater resistance (Guibault 2002). In a similar fashion,
Microsoft’s power in the market for personal computer operating systems has been treated
very differently by antitrust regulators in the US and competition regulators in the EU
(Winn and Wright 2008, § 15.02).
Conflicts among consumers and producers of copyrighted materials ranging from books
to music to film have been even more intense and likewise show few signs of abating any
time soon. Although as early as 1978, the impact that widespread use of computers would
have on the copyright industries was recognized by some (CONTU 1978), the full
repercussions of switching from analog to digital technology have only become apparent to
the average consumer much more recently. While publishers of digital content have worked
to develop and deploy systems for “digital rights management” (DRM) to preserve
threatened business models (CEC 2004), consumer advocates have argued that if such
technologies are widely deployed, they may erode competition, consumer choice, and
ultimately, the vitality of civil society (BEUC 2004).
The rise of social networking on the Internet has turned many consumers into
producers, turning the traditional distinction between consumers and producers on its
head and calling into question many fundamental assumptions behind consumer
protection law as a whole. The term Web 2.0 was coined in 2003 to describe what is
widely perceived to be a second generation of Web-based communities organized around
applications to facilitate collaborative work process and social interactions. Distinctive
features of Web 2.0 applications include end user control, rather than publisher control,
over the process of aggregating content and collaborative organization of content or
“folksonomies.” Web 2.0 applications include blogs, podcasts, wikis, “really simple
syndication” (RSS data feeds), mashups created “on the fly” from multiple sources, and
social networking. Traditional media companies have responded to the growth of collaborative production systems in a variety of ways, including litigation to block unauthorized
contributions of copyrighted materials.
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National consumer protection laws, some of which date back to the nineteenth century
and many of which date back to the 1960s and 1970s, often fail to address any of the new
problems facing consumers as a result of rapid technological innovation and the rapid
expansion of ICT product markets (Winn 2008b). In order to meet these challenges, new
consumer protection laws that differ not merely in substance but in form may be required.
One such new form might result from the formal, explicit harmonization of ICT standards
developed by private parties responding to global market forces with national consumer
protection laws. Such an innovation in formal regulation could build on the role ICT
standards already play as de facto regulators of consumer behavior.

Role of Standards in Regulating ICT Markets
The benefits to consumers of standardization are well-recognized. The historical roots of
the modern standards movement and the modern consumer movement were closely
intertwined (Krislov 1997, pp. 43–45). Before the 1930s, the American National Standards
Bureau (now known as the National Institute for Standards and Technology) played a major
role in broader consumer movement strategies to improve the quality and safety of
consumer products (Krislov 1997, p. 90). Consumer advisory committees to provide direct
consumer input into standard-setting processes were an important feature of consumer
protection policy in postwar Britain, although by the 1970s, the role of consumer groups
had diminished, reflecting doubts about the effectiveness of direct consumer participation in
technical standard-setting organizations (Hilton 2003, pp. 178–183).
For industrial economy products, standardization can reduce costs by simplifying
complex processes, increasing economies of scale in production, increasing the amount and
quality of information about products shared between vendors and their customers, and
promoting competition among vendors. Use of standards may have costs, too: reduced
product variety, increased risk of being locked-in to a particular solution to a problem, and a
possible one-time increase in production costs if existing production systems must be
reengineered to accommodate a later standard (Egan 2002).
When the relevant markets are defined by ICT networks, then standards may be even
more pivotal than in markets for traditional industrial economy products (Varian et al.
2004). Many products that contribute to ICT networks have high initial development costs
and low marginal production costs. For example, it may be very expensive to develop a
software program, but the cost of distributing each copy of the program in digital form may
approach zero. Markets for products with these characteristics were once called “natural
monopolies” by economists, and they tend to be dominated by one or a small handful of
producers with significant market power. Other features of markets based on ICT networks
may also tend to suppress competition, such as high switching costs or lock-in. For
example, if all of a consumer’s downloaded music files have been stored using a proprietary
file format that cannot be used on digital music players produced by other manufacturers,
the cost to a consumer of switching to a new digital music player might be prohibitively
high, resulting in that consumer being “locked-in” to the first manufacturer’s technology.
Strong positive “network effects” associated with using technology within a particular
network may also make consumers reluctant to change vendors or networks (Varian et al.
2004). “Direct” network effects are normally a function of how many people use a
particular network. For example, if an Internet service provider offers a proprietary instant
messaging service used by 100 million subscribers that is not interoperable with the instant
messaging services of any of its competitors who have fewer subscribers, then subscribers
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to the dominant ISP would have a strong incentive to stay with the dominant ISP in order to
have access to the largest possible instant messaging service subscriber base. “Indirect”
network effects are those created when end users are not sure whether a new ICT standard
or product will gain enough adoptions to generate strong direct network effects. For
example, competing groups of manufacturers may develop competing standards for highdefinition digital video disks and retail merchants may offer DVD players from both groups
to consumers. If consumers feel unsure which of the two technologies will ultimately
prevail, they may refrain from buying any high-definition DVD player until the conflict is
resolved, which in turn will make it harder for either of the competing technologies to
prevail.
Use of “open” standards in ICT markets can offset some of the competition-stifling
effects of ICT networks. While it is possible to say that a widely used proprietary
technology, such as the Windows operating system, is a de facto standard, it is clearly not
an open standard, and depending on how the proprietary technology is managed by its
owner, may be used to suppress competition. By contrast, ICT standards developed by the
IETF or the W3C are distributed without charge over the Internet and, where possible,
made available on a royalty-free basis with regard to any intellectual property required to
implement the standards (Weitzner 2002). Defining ICT networks with open standards can
reduce barriers to entry and promote competition among vendors of different products and
services.
Of course few consumers are interested in “open standards” per se. Most consumers are
interested in ICT products that allow them to easily socialize with others, engage in
recreational activities, and access cultural goods. ICT innovations can provide consumers
with access to new products, as well as lower prices or easier access to existing products.
ICT standards are an important and very visible strategy for the diffusion of innovation and
the promotion of competition in ICT markets, although other strategies (including
proprietary technologies such as Microsoft Windows or Apple iTunes) may also achieve
similar ends (Gasser and Palfrey 2007).
The “New Approach” to Harmonizing Law and Standards
Although the task of harmonizing technical standards with regulatory requirements is never
easy, the “New Approach” is a well-known example of success in this area. The New
Approach played an important role in creating a single market by removing technical
barriers to cross-border trade within the European Union (Schepel 2005, pp. 63–67). During
the early decades of the Common Market before the New Approach was adopted in 1985,
technical barriers to trade were recognized as a major obstacle to economic integration, but
efforts to establish harmonized European standards were frequently deadlocked. Political
conflicts could be intense when the goal was the development of broad, mandatory
European standards as individual Member States fought hard to push European-level
standards in a direction that favored their domestic industries and to block the adoption of
any new standards that conflicted with their existing national standards (Pelkmans 1987).
Before the system was overhauled, negligible progress had been made in removing
technical barriers to the growth of the internal market (McGee and Weatherill 1990, p. 582).
In contrast to that earlier experience, the New Approach is generally recognized as a
success story of European integration (Egan 2001, pp. 130–132). The New Approach
clarified the division of responsibility between the Commission, which retained control
over drafting the relevant directives, and European standards bodies, which retained control
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over the development of technical standards.2 It also shifted the focus of EU level standarddeveloping to minimal harmonization of only essential requirements with an emphasis on
performance standards rather than design standards. Implementation of the resulting
standard was optional, providing a “safe harbor” of presumed compliance with the
requirements of the associated directive for manufacturers if their products were certified
compliant with the EU standard. However, manufacturers retain the option of establishing
their compliance with the law even if their product does not conform to the referenced
technical standard, although proof of compliance might be more difficult. If a New
Approach reference standard becomes out of date, it can be replaced by withdrawing the
first standard and publishing a new standard in the Official Journal, without the need to
make any changes to the text of the directive or to any Member State implementing
legislation. In addition, the New Approach required Member States to provide notice of
plans to develop standards that might affect the internal market, allowing other Member
States to request that work on the standard be halted temporarily or that the work be
transferred to the EU level to avoid creating new barriers to trade. This “coregulatory”
system for coordinating the development of standards and legislation has been recognized
as a successful example of better regulation in a recent EU white paper on European
governance (CEC 2001).
Although the New Approach is lauded as a success by many, the legitimacy of such a
coregulatory system is questioned by others on the grounds that industry representatives
dominate the standard-developing process and may fail to consider broader public interests
that will ultimately be affected when the standards are implemented (McGee and Weatherill
1990, pp. 595–596). The practical challenges facing any effort to legitimate the
quasiregulatory work of standard-developing bodies by requiring participation of consumer
or other public interest representatives in the standard-developing process itself are wellrecognized (Dixon 1978; Mathis 2006). In 2003, the Commission launched a review of the
New Approach with a view to preserving the effectiveness of EU efforts to harmonize
technical standards and to remedy shortcomings which had become apparent in the 20 years
since it was first established. ANEC, the European organization advocating consumer
interests in standards, had generally been critical of the New Approach as being too
narrowly focused on technical issues and for using processes that were not transparent to
consumers or consumer advocates. In comments submitted in the context of the New
Approach review, ANEC asked that consumer stakeholder participation in standarddeveloping processes be increased to the extent possible and that alternative forms of
representing the public interest, such as the comitology process, be used when direct
participation may not be feasible (ANEC 2006).
Whatever questions might be raised about the legitimacy of the New Approach, the same
questions can generally be raised even more sharply regarding the work of de facto ICT
standards consortia. Furthermore, finding ways to establish and maintain an “interface”
between the work of national regulators and ICT standards consortia is certain to be
difficult. In recent decades, the only clear global success story for European ICT standards
has been the GSM mobile phone standard developed more than 20 years ago. Standards
produced by informal standards organizations based outside Europe today dominate both
global and European ICT markets, notwithstanding the efforts of EU regulators to insure
that EU ICT standard-developing efforts are globally competitive as well as transparent and
2

The European Union standards bodies are the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), the European
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), and the European Telecommunication Standards
Institute (ETSI).
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accountable. In 2008, DG Enterprise, the Commission’s primary standards regulator, began
looking for ways to overhaul its official policies to find ways to revitalize EU ICT standards
efforts as well as to increase the transparency and accountability of those informal consortia
whose standards are now used in Europe (Van Eecke and Truyens 2009). It will take some
time to see whether these efforts by leading EU standards experts will bear fruit in terms of
reducing the gap between EU regulatory objectives and global market norms. Consumer
protection regulators normally have less experience working with standards organizations
than regulators in charge of industrial policy, making the problem of harmonizing the
content of a fragmented, volatile patchwork of standards developed by informal consortia
with the content of consumer protection law even more challenging. Regulators may not
have the luxury of disregarding the work of informal ICT standards processes, however, if
the standards they produce are a new source of “soft” law that has already been added to the
complex patchwork of existing consumer protection laws.
One role that an updated form of the New Approach might play in consumer ICT
markets in the future could be reducing indirect network effects by facilitating the transition
from an established but obsolete technology to a newer technology. The Commission
experimented with a modified form of the New Approach with the intent of facilitating the
transition to “electronic signatures” as a new, improved form of online authentication with
the drafting of the Electronic Signature Directive. This attempt to develop a “New
Approach-Lite” for ICT standards has not met with much success, however. The ESignature Directive was structured in much the same way as New Approach directives for
industrial products because it referred to technical standards that would later be developed
and promoted interoperability among different e-signature systems around Europe. Unlike
the standards developed by European standards bodies for New Approach directives, the
sponsors of the E-Signature Directive hoped that the relevant standards would emerge from
the private sector in response to market demand, so no mandate to develop a reference
standard was given to one of the de jure European standards bodies. As a practical matter,
market demand for e-signatures turned out to be considerably less than the drafters of the
Directive anticipated, so a great deal of behind-the-scenes prodding from regulators was
required before appropriate standards emerged. The European Electronic Signature
Standardization Initiative (EESSI) developed standards that were later recognized as
having formally met the technical and market requirements of the E-Signature Directive
(Winn 2006). By 2008, the only significant adoptions of e-signature technologies in Europe
were in response to public sector requirements to access e-government services. So the first,
and so far only, attempt to update the New Approach to deal with the challenges of ICT
markets has not been much of a success, but this may be due more to the shortcomings of
e-signature technologies than to shortcomings in the regulatory process.

Harmonizing Consumer Protection Law and ICT Standards
The New Approach is a form of coregulation that brings together legislators and de jure
standard-developing organizations that are both working within the same legal and political
system. Coregulation based on cooperation between national authorities and international
ICT standards consortia will no doubt be more difficult to establish in the absence of a
common legal and political framework. The legal status of standard-developing
organizations and the standards they produce is often complex and ambiguous; and this
problem has only been exacerbated by the growth of informal standard-developing
consortia. The fluidity and lack of transparency associated with the use of proprietary
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technologies as de facto standards or the development of standards by private consortia
stand in marked contrast to the more stable, open processes associated with the
development of standards for industrial products by de jure standard-developing
organizations (Cargill 2001, p. 257).
Given the difficulty of achieving direct consumer involvement in the slower, more
transparent de jure standard-developing processes for industrial product standards, it seems
certain that direct consumer involvement in the faster, less transparent de facto ICT
standards processes will be even harder to achieve. While direct consumer ex ante
involvement at the point standards are being developed would clearly legitimate the work
of de facto ICT standard-setting organizations, it is unclear what authority national or
regional regulators would have to try to impose such a requirement on ICT standards
consortia operating outside their territories. National regulators may have few viable
strategies for influencing consortia behavior while standards are under development other
than the threat of ex post liability once new ICT products have been brought to market. A
controversial recent French law can be seen as an attempt to do just that.
In 2006, France enacted the “Loi sur le Droit d’Auteur et les Droits Voisins dans la
Société de l’Information” (DADVSI)3 which includes, among other provisions, a
requirement that technical protection measures (TPMs), which are used by content
producers to control access to their works, must not prevent effective interoperability
between digital file formats and the various software and devices on which they can be
played (Jondet 2006). French lawmakers were worried that a successful proprietary TPM
technology could become a de facto standard, thus locking in customers of cultural goods
to the exclusive benefit of the technology provider.
French lawmakers were particularly concerned about what was already happening in the
field of digital music distribution. Apple had been dominating the market both in sales of
digital music files, through its iTunes music store, and in sales of portable media players,
thanks to its iPod player. Part of this success stemmed from Apple’s strategy to use its
exclusive TPM technology, called FairPlay, to tie the music sold on iTunes with the iPod
player. As a consequence, iPod owners who wished to buy digital music could only get
compatible files from iTunes. Conversely, owners of digital players produced by another
manufacturer could not play songs bought from Apple. Apple’s proprietary technology was
becoming the de facto standard for digital music distribution. French lawmakers felt that
such a technology-based monopoly in the market for cultural goods would be detrimental to
consumers and to the dissemination and equal access to culture.
To tackle this issue, the French Parliament had to be creative. International instruments
mandating the legal recognition and protection of TPMs did not address the negative
consequences TPMs might have on consumer choice in the market for cultural goods. The
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Internet Treaties4 adopted in 1996 and the
2001 European Copyright Directive (EUCD)5 were drafted at a time when TPM technology
was still in its infancy and had yet to be deployed on a large scale. Problems associated with
TPMs first emerged only a few years after the adoption of the international instruments
which legalized them. France had missed the December 2002 deadline for transposing the
3

Loi no. 2006-961 du 1er août 2006 relative au Droit d’Auteur et aux Droits Voisins dans la Société de
l’Information; parue au JO no. 178 du 3 août 2006, page 11529.

4

The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) adopted
in Geneva on December 20, 1996.

5

Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.
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EUCD into national law, so by the time the French lawmakers finally took up the matter in
earnest in 2006, the potential impact of TPMs on consumer choice had become fully
visible. The French Parliament was in the awkward position of being under an international
obligation to legalize TPMs, while nevertheless being fully aware of the problems with this
approach, and so decided to try to ameliorate some of the shortcomings of TPMs. The
French Senate Committee argued that, although the Copyright Directive did not itself
contain provisions relating to consumer issues, the recitals of the directive provided some
legal basis for an interoperability requirement (Sénat 2006, p. 145). The Senate Committee
pointed to Recital 48 which states that the legal protection granted to TPMs should not be
limitless and notably that it “should respect proportionality and should not prohibit those
devices or activities which have a commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent the technical protection.” The Senate Committee also pointed to Recital 54
which acknowledges that even though “important progress has been made in the
international standardisation of [TPMs] …differences between [TPMs] could lead to an
incompatibility of systems within the Community,” then concluding that “compatibility and
interoperability of the different systems should be encouraged” and that “the development
of global systems” should also be encouraged. French lawmakers took the initiative to
translate these mere aspirations into a legal requirement.
They decided that some form of “technology-forcing” legislation was needed to compel
recalcitrant copyright owners using TPMs to support interoperability. The option of
introducing compulsory licensing had been strongly opposed by the business community,
so the less coercive requirement that TPMs should interoperate was adopted instead. The
parliamentary debate then focused on determining which institution should be in charge of
enforcing this requirement. Civil courts were deemed unsuitable because they would lack
the expertise, speed, and secrecy required to deal with highly sensitive and fast-evolving
technologies. The Council on Competition would have been the preferred choice of
lawmakers as it did have the relevant competence. Unfortunately for French lawmakers,
however, the Council had ruled in 2004 that Apple’s refusal to make its TPM technology
interoperate with that of its competitor was not an abuse of dominant position.6 The French
Parliament observed that the Council’s decision was legally sound and that, since then, no
new element had emerged that would make the Council reverse its decision (Sénat 2006,
p. 152). As a result, it was clear that if the Council were given the mandate to enforce a new
interoperability requirement, it would likely refuse once again to find a legal justification to
intervene in the market, thus making the whole exercise pointless.
Ultimately, the DADVSI law created a dedicated independent administrative authority to
enforce the interoperability requirement. The administrative body was given the power to
force the owner of a TPM to disclose information essential to interoperability, notably by
imposing huge fines. France is the first country to address the problem posed by TPMs by
mandating interoperability. So far, the mechanism has not yet been tested. This is in part
due to the fact that, as of 2008, the independent authority was not yet fully operational. In
2008, another bill had been introduced to completely overhaul the structure of the authority
by changing its name, composition, and missions, notably by involving the authority in
combating illegal file-sharing. Until the adoption of the second bill, which is expected to
occur in early 2009, it seems unlikely that an interoperability case can be brought before the
authority. Even after the authority is fully functional, the strict rules regarding the entities
allowed to refer a case might ensure that no interoperability case would ever be brought
forward. Indeed, under the current system, consumers and consumer groups are not allowed
6

Conseil de la Concurrence, Décision 04-D-54 du 9 novembre 2004.
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to bring an interoperability claim before the authority. This possibility is only open to some
technology companies, namely, software publishers, manufacturers of technical systems,
and services providers. The decision to exclude consumers from a process designed to
protect them seems, at first, inconsistent. However, French lawmakers argued that allowing
the general public to have access to highly confidential information about TPMs could
compromise their integrity. Technology companies were deemed more able both to
safeguard and make good use of the information essential to interoperability. However,
excluding consumers from the process could render the whole mechanism pointless if
technology companies enter a tacit pact of nonaggression. It will be interesting to see, once
the authority is up and running, which technology company, if any, will bring the first
interoperability case. But in spite of these shortcomings, the mere existence of the DADVSI
law may have already had an impact with regard to TPMs in the field of digital music
(Jondet 2007). It may have played an important part in Apple’s decision, in early 2007, to
push records labels to offer digital music without TPMs. Apple was already facing strong
opposition from consumers and legal challenges in the US and Europe over its TPM
technology, and the prospect of having to deal with French regulators could have been the
deciding factor in the company’s change of direction.
ICT Standards and Consumer Protection as “Better Regulation”
While this French attempt to promote interoperability is innovative and important, it also
suffers from some obvious shortcomings, so other countries may be reluctant to use it as a
model for regulating consumer ICT markets. National authorities seeking new strategies to
protect consumers from the harmful effects of unregulated competition in global ICT
markets will need to be at least as creative as the French authorities, however. The notion of
“better regulation” might provide a general framework within which national initiatives to
regulate consumer ICT markets, including DADVSI, can be both developed and evaluated.
Better regulation generally refers to efforts to streamline government while increasing its
effectiveness (Weatherill 2007). Even though the term was not in widespread use in 1985,
the New Approach can be seen as an early example of better regulation because it
combined industry self-regulation based on standard-developing with conventional
regulation based on directives to successfully promote the growth of the internal market.
While neither the theory nor the practice of “better regulation” is without controversy,
the notion may nevertheless help provide a modest normative framework for the analysis of
the complex interface between pervasive ICT technologies and conventional legal
institutions. Better regulation, like regulation itself, is a slippery concept to define with
any rigor. Morgan and Yeung suggest that regulation can be thought of as a control system
with at least the three following components: setting norms that permit distinctions between
more or less preferred outcomes to be made; gathering information to monitor the current or
changing states of the system; and some capacity for behavior modification (Morgan and
Yeung 2007, p. 3). Systems for developing product and ICT standards both include these
three elements, making them one more example of the kind of architecture-based regulation
frequently encountered in the information economy (Lessig 1999). The problem of crafting
legislation that harmonizes ICT standards with the public interest enshrined in more
conventional forms of legislation is an example of the problem of “structural coupling”
identified by Teubner in his analysis of the “regulatory trilemma” (Teubner 1987, p. 5). For
the purposes of this discussion, therefore, “better regulation” will be defined as any
resolution of the problem of structural coupling between the “code-based” regulation and
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more conventional consumer protection laws that is both reasonably efficient and also
recognized as legitimate.
While the UK has led “better regulation” movement within the EU (Hodges 2007), its
own recent efforts to address consumer rights in ICT product markets do appear to qualify
as “better regulation,” at least if finding a balance of consumer and producer interests
widely recognized as fair is required for legitimacy. In 2006, the Gowers Review noted that
the procedure established to permit end users to complain that TPM prevented them from
benefiting from certain copyright exceptions appeared to be a failure and recommended that
it be reformed (Gowers 2006, p. 73). The procedure analyzed in the Gowers Review
requires the end users to issue a “notice of complaint” to the Secretary of State who can
then take steps to remedy the problem. Although the problem of TPMs preventing
consumers from enjoying the benefits of copyright exceptions is widespread, the slow and
cumbersome procedure for lodging complaints had never been used. In terms of Teubner’s
regulatory trilemma, the complaint procedure appears to be failing as a result of “mutual
indifference” between the social and legal spheres (i.e., irrelevance). By contrast, the
regulatory force of TPMs appears to be “juridifying” or disintegrating the social and
cultural spheres that copyright exceptions were intended to protect. In July 2008, the
consultation on legislative options to address illicit P2P file-sharing issued by BERR
focused exclusively on finding regulatory solutions to the failure of TPM to achieve their
primary objective (blocking illicit copying) and did not address consumers’ need to limit
the scope of TPM to insure that legal copying remains feasible (BERR 2008). UK
regulators did not take the opportunity to promote any novel regulatory strategies, such as
promoting the development of TPM standards to insure that consumers can actually enjoy
the benefits of copyright exceptions, but instead focused on requiring ISPs to assume new
IPR enforcement obligations within a new system of “self-regulation” designed to
accommodate the demands of the copyright industries.
Consumer protection may target either consumer economic interests or consumer health
and safety interests (Whitman 2007, p. 367). Consumer protection laws applied to ICT
product markets may take the form of economic regulation to reduce abuses of monopoly
power or social regulation to insure that consumers are treated fairly. The tendency for a
monopoly provider to emerge in many ICT markets as a result of strong network effects may
be deemed a market failure that justifies a regulatory intervention on behalf of consumers.
From a better regulation perspective, the challenge would be to find the most cost-effective
form of government intervention to correct such a failure, while insuring that the cure is not
worse than the disease. Trying to apply traditional “command and control” regulation of the
type once applied to “natural monopolies” such as telecommunications to consumer ICT
markets would only produce a regulatory failure at least as severe as the market failure it was
designed to correct, resulting in less innovation, higher prices, and fewer choices for
consumers. A better regulation strategy would look for less formal, more flexible alternatives
to traditional prescriptive regulation that would encourage voluntary private sector compliance with regulatory objectives. For example, instead of mandating the use of a standard,
the public sector might provide incentives for private sector development of open ICT
standards and promote market adoption of products based on those standards by targeting
public procurement spending. Or a national regulator could agree to recognize compliance
with a privately established standard as establishing presumptive compliance with a statutory
requirement. If successful, a better regulation strategy would correct market failure with
lower enforcement costs and better compliance that traditional regulation could achieve.
Under the New Approach, the Commission simply requested that a de jure European
standards body develop standards in support of directives; and the standards were
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developed. With global ICT product markets, regulators may not even be aware of the
existence of different consortia working to develop ICT standards, and even if they were
aware of them, would probably have a hard time predicting which among competing
standards would ultimately prevail in global markets. Because explicit ex ante cooperation
between national authorities and global consortia on the substance of ICT standards may
not be feasible, national authorities may find it more effective to focus on clarifying ex post
consequences for failure to meet minimum requirements. While the interoperability
provisions of DADVSI are clearly a step in this direction, it might be a bit too generous
to characterize DADVSI as “better regulation,” given its weak enforcement provisions, the
absence of industry support, and the lack of any mechanisms to promote responsible selfregulation within copyright industries.
The effectiveness of ex post strategies such as DADVSI might be increased if the
regulatory objectives could be articulated more clearly. In the case of DADVSI, this would
require clarification of the concept of interoperability, which in turn would make it easier
for private actors to further those regulatory objectives while defining the content of ICT
standards. The idea of “interoperability” is easy to invoke, but can be very difficult to nail
down with any specificity, however, so this may be difficult to do (Gasser and Palfrey
2007). A more rigorous ex post liability strategy would be consistent with demands from
consumer advocates that consumer interests in intellectual property (such as copyright
limitations and exceptions) should be more fully and explicitly articulated, making them
easier to embody in the operation of ICT products (BEUC 2004). It would also be
consistent with the notion of “enforced self-regulation” which delegates to industry
associations the development of standards that governments retain the power to enforce
(Parker and Braithwaite 2005).
Skeptics of better regulation, like skeptics of the New Approach, question the degree to
which self-regulation can be an effective substitute for conventional regulation. Selfregulatory systems may be plagued by the same sources of regulatory failure as formal
government institutions, while providing even less transparency and accountability to the
public (Ogus 1995). In the case of ICT product markets, however, much of the coercive
quality of ICT standards as a form of regulation comes from market forces caused by strong
network effects (Winn 2008a), not from the imprimatur of public sector approval. To the
extent that markets for ICT products are increasingly globally integrated, while national
regulation remains fragmented, national authorities may be unable to halt the growth of
self-regulation in ICT markets. Collaboration among national authorities to create more
powerful ex post incentives redirecting the work of ICT standards consortia toward the
goals of national consumer protection laws might at least help channel the growth of
self-regulation.

Conclusions
ICT products play an important role in the lives of consumers today, but many of the ICT
standards essential to the operation those products are developed in global markets beyond
the control of any national consumer protection authority. Although traditional national
consumer protection laws may be unable to correct failures arising in global ICT standards
markets, it may nevertheless be possible to preserve a role for national authorities in
defining the content of those standards. Designing effective regulatory strategies to
influence the content of ICT standards ex ante (while they are still being developed and
before they are embedded in products being sold to consumers) will be difficult, however.
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Recent French legislation requiring interoperability for copyright technical protection
measures provides ex post review of the impact of ICT standards embodied in consumer
electronics. This in turn may create indirect incentives for private standard-developing
organizations to focus more on consumer rights ex ante as part of the standard-developing
process. Viewing the problem as a “better regulation” challenge that can be addressed with
decentralized, informal, flexible forms of government intervention may lead to even more
effective regulatory strategies to protect consumer interests in ICT markets.
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